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PROPERTY RIGHTS IN RECOVERED SEA TREASURE:
THE SALVOR'S PERSPECTIVE
Nerves frayed as physical exhaustion set in.
Divers worked in a murky tangle of air and com-
munication lines, hot water continuously pump-
ing through their wetsuits for warmth .... 'This
is the hardest [said one diver] bad currents, high
seas, a rotting ship. The [Andrea] Doria was a
weird wreck, very unforgiving.'"
This passage, from a recent Time magazine article, illustrates not
only the hazards of undersea salvage operations but also the growing
public awareness of those operations. This interest has been sparked
by impressive underwater finds such as the recovery of property from
the Andrea Doria,2 the recovery of Russian gold from the legendary
Edinburgh, the raising of the partially intact wooden hull of the Mary
Rose from its resting place of 437 years,4 the continuing recovery of
gold by a Florida corporation from a sunken Spanish flagship' and an
eccentric Japanese billionaire's efforts to salvage a czarist fleet.0
Modern treasure salvors' motivations are as varied as the treasure
they recover. Weekend divers salvage for sport, adventure and primar-
1. Gimbel's Grail-Diving to the Andrea Doria, TIME, Sept. 14, 1981, at 22.
2. Id. The Andrea Doria sank two hundred miles off the east coast of the United
States some eleven hours after its historic collision with the Stockholm on July 26, 1956.
In September 1981, Peter Gimbel and a crew of divers recovered one of two safes which
were aboard the sunken vessel. Id.
3. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1981, at A9, col. 1. Eight hundred feet below the surface
of the sub-Arctic waters of the Barents Sea, the Edinburgh, a Royal Navy cruiser, had
remained out of reach of salvors since its sinking by a Nazi U-boat in 1942. Improved
technology, however, has allowed the recovery of $76 million in gold from the ship's
bomb room. N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1981, at Al, col. 3.
4. N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1982, at A12, col. 3. In 1545, the Mary Rose, the pride of
King Henry VIII's fleet, sank one mile off the coast of Portsmouth. The seventeen-year
salvage operation involved 500 divers and cost an estimated seven million dollars. The
130 foot oak hull was successfully recovered together with almost 17,000 artifacts.
Breech-loading and muzzle-loading guns, a barber-surgeon's amputation saw, sundials,
utensils and a folding backgammon table were among the artifacts recovered. Id.
5. See Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Treasure Salvors #2].
6. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1980, at A3, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1980, at A2, col.
3. Ryoichi Saskawa, an 81 year old Japanese businessman, has begun a salvage operation
to recover $3.7 billion in sunken treasure from the czarist warship Admiral Nakhimov
lost in Japanese waters in 1905. The cruiser sank in 310 feet of water in a sea battle
during the Russo-Japanese War. Id.
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ily for enjoyment.' Archaeologists and historians undertake salvage op-
erations seeking artifacts and answers from the wrecks.9 Other salvors,
including corporations, work primarily for monetary gain.' This latter
group invests millions of dollars and devotes substantial amounts of
time to research, locate and salvage the cargo of sunken vessels.10
A modern salvage operation is not a glamorous adventure but an
undertaking of frustrating and often life-threatening hazards.1 Despite
sophisticated equipment,1 2 many of the obstacles which have hindered
recovery of lost wrecks for hundreds of years continue to face the sal-
vors. Weather remains a formidable opponent, demanding the salvor's
constant attention. Storms and high winds create a dangerous environ-
ment for surface support vessels, and can cause dramatic changes in
underwater currents with the potential to scatter the wreck over the
sea floor or to cover it with sand and debris. 3 Not only do sharks, eels
7. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1980, § 1, at 61, col. 1 (a maritime historian has de-
termined that at least 633 vessels were sunk off the Maryland coast); see also N.Y.
Times, July 14, 1981, at B1, col. 2 (a Nazi U-boat sunk during the last days of World
War II and numerous other wrecks lie off Block Island attracting hundreds of sports
divers each weekend).
8. N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1982, at A12, col. 3. The raising of the Mary Rose, along
with an estimated 17,000 artifacts, was one of the most ambitious and successful under-
water archaeological operations of our time. The quality and large number of artifacts
recovered with the Mary Rose will give archaeologists and historians a rare opportunity
to research aspects of life aboard a 16th century warship, which cannot be ascertained
from ships logs and other records. Id. See also Boyd, Raise The Monitor, SKIN DIVER,
August 1981, at 18 (a debate has emerged among archaeologists and divers as to whether
an attempt should be made to raise the historic ironclad Monitor); N.Y. Times, Dec. 8,
1981, at Cl, col. 1 (archaeologists fear that amateur treasure hunters may pillage a
wrecked vessel believed to be one of Columbus' ships, the Pinta).
9. See, e.g., Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d at 333. Treasure Salvors Inc. spent
more than two million dollars locating the wreck of what is believed to be the Nuestra
Senora de Atocha. The Atocha has surrendered well over six million dollars worth of
treasure to date. Id.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d at 333. During the salvage operation
of the Nuestra Senora de Atocha four members of the crew were lost to the sea, includ-
ing the son and daughter-in-law of Mel Fisher, leader of the operation. Id.
12. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1981, at A9, col. 1. H.M.S. Edinburgh, a British
warship, sank in English waters in 1942 and settled to a depth of 800 feet. After four
unsuccessful attempts were made, the wreck was thought beyond the reach of a salvage
operation. Then, with new technology developed for the North Sea oil industry, the ves-
sel was located and $76 million in gold was successfully salvaged. A computer located the
vessel based upon historical data of past sightings of the ship. Divers were able to de-
scend to the extreme depth of 800 feet with the aid of a one man spherical bell. See also
Rogal, Treasure of the Edinburgh, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 5, 1981, at 58.
13. See Gimbel's Grail-Diving to the Andrea Doria, TIME, Sept. 14, 1981, at 22.
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and other dangerous marine life 4 pose a threat, but the divers must
constantly contend with frigid waters and severe depth pressure. The
wreck itself can be a source of danger; the Edinburgh, for example, had
live torpedoes and dynamite on board."5 The physical deterioration of
the sunken wreck may demand extreme caution from the divers when
maneuvering through the vessel. Deterioration in the condition of the
property recovered may also become an obstacle when it is brought to
the surface, as antiquated cargo may disintegrate upon exposure to the
atmosphere."
Once sunken property is brought safely to the surface, the diffi-
culties to be overcome by the salvors are no longer physical but legal.
One Florida district judge has said: "As great as the perils of the sea
are and were, the greatest perils to the treasure itself came not from
the sea but from two unlikely sources. Agents of two governments [the
United States and Florida] . . . claimed the treasure as belonging to"
their respective governments. 7 In two recent cases' s where salvage op-
erations proved successful, the salvors had to face years of litigation in
order to force state governments to return seized treasure.' Federal
and state officials, who have recently begun to assert title to property
salvaged in these and other cases, have challenged the finder's philoso-
14. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1981, §1, at 28, col. 1 (eels and lobsters were in
residence in the Mary Rose off England's southern coast prior to the recovery of the
vessel); N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1980, at A2, col. 3 (giant deadly conger eels plague the
recovery of the czarist cruiser Admiral Nakhimov).
15. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1981, at A9, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1981, at Al,
col. 5.
16. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1981, at 8, col. 3. When a bank safe was sal-
vaged from the Andrea Doria it had to be kept in salt water to preserve any paper
currency that might have remained inside. Id.
17. Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wreck and Abandoned Vessel, 459 F.
Supp. 507, 511 (S.D. Fla. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Treasure Salvors #3].
18. Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978); Platoro Ltd., Inc. v. Un-
identified Remains of a Vessel, 518 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. Tex, 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Platoro].
19. Each of these cases were filed a short time after the recovery of all or part of
the resulting treasure. See supra note 18. Salvaging operations in the Treasure Salvors
Cases began in 1971. Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d at 333. Despite four lower court
decisions favorable to the salvors, the state refused to return the seized property. Id. The
enforcement of the district court judgment by a warrant of arrest which named certain
state officials was finally affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in 1982. Fla.
Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 3304 (1982). In Platoro, the find
occurred in 1967 resulting in five court decisions attempting to free the salvaged goods.
In May of 1981 an order directing the state to either return the property or its estimated
market value, was handed down by the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas. Platoro, 518 F. Supp. at 823.
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phy,20 which has consistently been applied in this country for more
than a century."1 Under the guise of protecting cultural and historical
property, these governmental declarations of sovereign title could radi-
cally affect the fundamental character of the law of salvage. This new
hazard could prove to be the most formidable obstacle facing hopeful
salvors. These assertions of title are evidence of the continuing struggle
between private enterprise and government regulation over treasure re-
covered from the sea.
This note will consider two aspects of the law of salvage that af-
fect the rights of parties who recover sunken property. The elements of
salvage will be set out and considered in detail in order to understand
the nature, policies and peculiarities of the law. An examination of the
origins and evolution of the rights involved in the salvage award and
title will follow. The present state of salvage law in the United States
will then be considered, with a focus on two areas of the law that have
been the center of recent litigation and continue to be topics of debate.
The two aspects to be discussed are a government's assertion of title in
salvaged property, and the use of the law of finds as a guiding principle
in deciding salvage claims. A court's response to these issues in a sal-
vage action will affect not only the amount of award set by the court,
but also the decision as to rightful title to the recovered property. For
the purpose of illustration, the facts of the Andrea Doria salvage oper-
ation will be presented to highlight the potential legal problems faced
by the courts and by litigants under existing case law.
FUNDAMENTALS OF SALVAGE
Offering a reward for saving property from a distressed or
wrecked ship has been an established part of maritime law since Ro-
man times.2" The term salvage has come to signify two distinct aspects
of the salvage process: the actual service rendered by the salvors and
the reward payable to them for such work.23
A salvage service, in its simplest form, can be defined as the vol-
untary giving of assistance to a vessel or cargo which relieves the prop-
20. See, e.g., Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d at 330; Platoro, 518 F. Supp. at 816;
State ex rel. Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., 95 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
881 (1957); Bruton v. Flying "W" Enterprises, Inc., 273 N.C. 399, 160 S.E.2d 482 (1968).
21. Admiralty courts have consistently awarded title to the finder of property
abandoned at sea, in absence of the original owner. See infra notes 105-15 and accompa-
nying text.





erty from impending peril at sea.2 To constitute a salvage service, the
performance must be on navigable waters and the assistance must be
rendered voluntarily, rather than be the result of a legal or official duty
to give aid.25 In The Blackwall, 21 the Supreme Court said that "useful
service of any kind rendered to a vessel or her cargo, exposed to any
impending danger and imminent peril of loss or damage, may entitle
those who rendered such service to salvage reward. ' '2 7 The variety of
services which may qualify an actor for a salvage claim runs the spec-
trum from the dramatic to the mundane.28 Central to the idea of a
salvage service, however, is that the salvor acts to overcome difficulties
and deterrents. 2 9 The quality and extent of contributory service need
only be slight to qualify for a salvage award; the degree of service may
affect the final amount awarded, but not its validity.30 Clearly, the rais-
ing of a sunken ship or its cargo comes within any definition of a sal-
vage service.
31
24. See, e.g., The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384, 384 (1880); The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 1, 11-12 (1870). Kent defined salvage as "compensation allowed to persons by
whose assistance a ship or its cargo has been saved in whole or in part from impending
danger .. " 3 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *245.
25. 3A M. NORRIS, supra note 22, § 2, at 1-5.
26. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1 (1870).
27. Id. at 11. In this case the Court approved an award to the owners of a tug
boat which had helped firemen fight a blaze aboard another ship. Id. The decision did
not consider the firemen's right to a reward for their services in the salvage operation. Id.
at 15.
28. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 8-2, at 536 (2d ed. 1975).
These commentators said:
The act of salvage need not be so dramatic and need not even
consist in rendering physical assistance: standing by or escort-
ing a distressed ship in a position to give aid if it becomes
necessary, giving information on the channel to follow . . . to
avoid running aground, carrying a message as a result of which
necessary aid and equipment are forthcoming have all quali-
fied. So long as the ship is in peril, any voluntary act which
contributes to her ultimate safety may rank as an act of
salvage.
Id. at 537 (footnotes omitted).
29. C. SurrON, THE ASSESSING OF SALVAGE AWARDS 5 (1949).
30. See, e.g., Markakis v. S/S Volendam, 486 F. Supp. 1103, 1110 (S.D.N.Y.
1980). The court held valid a salvage claim made by the captain and crew of a vessel
which merely towed a distressed ship away from the Cuban coast. The distressed vessel
had lost power and was in danger of drifting too near the Cuban shore when the salvors
made contact. The salvors did not tow the ship to safety because they were met by an-
other ship which completed the towing service. Id. at 1105.
31. See, e.g., Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625, 628-29 (1887). The
raising of a sunken wreck or her cargo is considered within the realm of a salvage service
because it is part of "those things which have been committed to, or lost in, the sea or its
19821
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It has been well settled in American courts since The Sabine32
that to sustain a claim for salvage services three requisites must be
present. They are: (a) marine peril; (b) service voluntarily rendered;
and (c) success in whole or in part.33 Often challenged in a salvage ac-
tion is the element of marine peril. Typically, the challenger argues
that the object could not be salvaged because it was in no danger of
being lost. 4 The burden of proving the existence of the required dan-
ger is placed upon the salvor, for without proper proof there can be no
valid claim. 35 Marine peril will be found if it is shown that there was a
reasonable apprehension that without the action of the salvors the ob-
ject would have been lost. 3 In Treasure Salvors #2, 3 7 responding to
the argument that no peril existed in the salvage of an abandoned and
wrecked ship that sank in a hurricane in the year 1622, the court said:
"Marine peril includes more than the threat of storm, fire, or piracy to
a vessel in navigation . . . [t]here is no dispute that the Atocha was
lost. Even after discovering the vessel's location it is still in peril of
being lost through the actions of the elements.
3
The second element necessary for a court to find a valid claim for
salvage services is the requirement that such services be voluntary. The
importance of voluntariness in the law of salvage is apparent when one
considers that no similar doctrine exists in the terrene common law
which would reward a person who, at great risk, recovered property
from a natural disaster or great peril upon the land.39 This disparity is
branches, or other public navigable waters, and have been found and rescued." Id. at
629.
32. 101 U.S. 384 (1880).
33. Id. at 384. Justice Clifford, the author of the opinion of the court, used some-
what different language five years earlier in The Clarita and The Clara, 90 U.S. (23
Wall.) 1, 16 (1875). For more recent cases using these elements, see Legnos v. MN Olga
Jacob, 498 F.2d 666, 669 (5th Cir. 1974); Markakis v. S/S Volendam, 486 F. Supp. 1103,
1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Cobb Coin Co., Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned
Sailing Vessel, 549 F.Supp. 540, 557-560 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
34. See, e.g., Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F. 2d at 337.
35. 35 HALSBURY, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 1119, at 738 (V. Simonds 3d ed.
1961).
36. See Fort Myres Shell & Dredging Co. v. Barge NBC 512, 404 F.2d 137, 139
(5th Cir. 1968); Tidewater Salvage, Inc. v. Weyerhauser Co., 633 F.2d 1304, 1306 (9th
Cir. 1980). See also 3A M. NORRIS, supra note 22, § 185, at 14-1. "The peril required in a
salvage service need not necessarily be one of imminent and absolute danger. The prop-
erty must be in danger, either presently or reasonably to be apprehended." Id. (footnote
omitted).
37. 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978).
38. Id. at 337.
39. This distinction in admiralty law was noted very early in our history by Chief




explained by the fact that there is an historic and continuing public
policy to promote spontaneous effort in the saving of property dis-
tressed at sea.'
The heart of the law of salvage, the award, is the direct result of
this public policy encouraging swift maritime rescue." Liberal awards
are so characteristic of the law of salvage that awards have come to be
termed salvage.'2 This "salvage" is the reward that the law allows for
services deemed meritorious.' 3 It is not limited to simple payment for
services rendered." The reward is not assessed by the court as merely
compensation pro opera et labore,45 nor under the principles of quan-
tum meruit.'6 Instead, the amount of this award is a reflection of the
If the property of an individual on land be exposed to the
greatest peril, and be saved by the voluntary exertions of any
person whatever; if valuable goods be rescued from a house in
flames, at the imminent hazard of life by the salvor, no remu-
neration in the shape of salvage is allowed. The act is highly
meritorious, and the service is as great as if rendered at sea.
Yet the claim for salvage could not, perhaps, be supported. It
is certainly not made. Let precisely the same . . . hazard, be
(sic) rendered at sea, and a very ample reward will be be-
stowed in the courts of justice.
Id. at 158. See also G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 8-1, at 532 (2d ed.
1975).
40. See 3A M. NORRIS, supra note 22, § 12, at 1-17. The polarity of results can be
traced as far back as Roman law, which is considered to be the first system of law to
compensate the volunteer who saved the property of another. Id. § 6. The importance of
promoting maritime commerce is the major justification given for allowing such distinc-
tion of treatment. See generally The Blaireau, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 143 (1804).
41. See The Craster Hall, 213 F. 436 (5th Cir. 1914). One court has said that:
"The amount awarded as salvage comprises two elements, viz., adequate remuneration
• . . and a bounty given to. . . encourag[e] similar exertions in future cases. The relative
amounts . . . depend on the special facts and merits of each case." Id. at 437 (quoting
The Sandringham, 10 F. 556 (E.D. Va. 1882)). On this topic Sutton states that:
The award is intended to encourage others to use the utmost
exertion and the utmost promptness in saving such property
• . . when exposed to perils of and on the sea, perils that can
be of sudden and catastrophic kind and that usually occur in
ways cutting off all but sea help, often all help but that of the
vessel fortunately in the particular vicinity.
C. SUTTON, supra note 29, at 4.
42. See The Sandringham, 10 F. 556, 571 (E.D. Va. 1882).
43. The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 12 (1869).
44. See The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384, 384 (1880); The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.)
1, 12 (1869).
45. For work and labor. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1094 (5th ed. 1979).
46. As much as he deserves. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1119 (5th ed. 1979). See
The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 12 (1869); The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384, 384 (1880).
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nature, risk and value of the salvage service rendered.4" Justice Story
commented on the award in The Henery Ewbank4" where it was
stated:
It rises to a higher dignity. It takes its source in a
deeper policy. It combines with private merit and
individual sacrifices larger consideration of the
public good, of commercial liberality, and of in-
ternational justice. It offers a premium, by way of
honorary reward, for prompt and ready assistance
to human suffering .... 4o
The importance of maritime commerce to the nations of the
world has mandated this use of equitable principles for rewarding
spontaneous service.5 0 Thus, founded as it is upon the public policy to
aid vessels in distress, the salvage award should be viewed as encour-
agement for others to act rather than compensation for those who ac-
ted.5 The award is the most distinguishing part of the law of sal-
vage as it is so variant to the terrene common law.62 Liberal awards
are essential to admiralty law in order to encourage even the most
unwilling salvor. 5 As a result, it must be conceded that there is no
announced system for weighing facts, and, though comparable cases
may be considered,"4 there is no strict rule upon which the courts may
47. Id. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of
the determination of the amount of the award.
48. 11 F. Cas. 1166 (C.C. Mass. 1833) (No. 6376).
49. Id. at 1170.
50. KENNEDY'S CIVIL SALVAGE 12 (K. McGuffin 4th ed. 1958). See The Charles
Henry, 5 F. Cas. 509 (E.D.N.Y. 1865) (No. 2617). There is a shared interest among all
nations to promote the safety of both property and human life at sea. Id. at 510.
51. In The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 14 (1869), the Court concluded that
public policy must encourage mariners to engage in labors which may be both dangerous
and costly; therefore, the law must allow liberal compensation for such efforts.
52. See supra notes 39-40.
53. The Missouri, 17 F. Cas. 484, 488 (D.C. Mass. 1854) (No. 9654).
[P]ublic policy requires that such a promise of reward be held
out, in case of success, that all those in a situation and compe-
tent to render relief, shall be eager to do so, from the mere
hope of gain: for example, that the sailor, who alone sees from
the mast-head a vessel in distress, or the master, who descries
her at a distance with a telescope, shall not be tempted to pass
her by, but shall have a prospect of pecuniary advantage,
which may prompt his efforts.
Id. See also Lancaster v. Smith, 330 F. Supp. 65 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
54. See, e.g., 3A M. NoRRIs, supra note 22, § 239, at 20-5. Cases are not dependa-
ble authority because the facts of two salvage cases are seldom identical. When two cases
are comparable as to the facts, the precedent is not used as a rigid yardstick. See
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rely" when deciding upon the specific amount to be awarded. The
award will usually be based on the overall circumstances of the partic-
ular case and the equitable demands of each party. 6
The various factors that may influence the award are well-known,
and yet they have never been precisely measured. In The Blackwall,5
7
the ingredients were outlined as:
A. The degree of danger from which the lives
and property are rescued.
B. The value of the property saved.
C. The risk incurred by the salvors in securing
the property from the impending peril.
D. The promptitude, skill, and energy employed
by the salvors.
E. The value of the property employed to render
the service.
F. The time and labor expended by the
salvors.5 '
When calculating the salvage award, the court must consider the possi-
bility of excesses.5" If the award is too liberal, it may encourage unnec-
essary services or discourage owners from finding help.60 On the other
Platoro, 518 F.Supp. 816, 821 (W.D. Tex. 1981).
55. See Platoro, 518 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. Tex. 1981). The court found that
neither the common law rule of moiety nor a fixed percentage were applicable in this
particular case. Id. at 821. In The Connemara, 108 U.S. 352 (1883), the Supreme Court
said that the amount of award "is largely a matter of fact and discretion, which cannot
be reduced to precise rules, but depends upon a consideration of all circumstances of
each case." Id. at 359.
56. C. SurrON, supra note 29, at 1. Sutton focuses on the lack of any mathemati-
cal relationship between the physical factors of a salvage incident, on the one hand, and
the sum of money awarded, on the other. His work concentrates on analyzing the various
individual factors that consistently influence the outcome of British salvage cases. Id. at
1-2.
57. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1 (1869).
58. 3A M. NoRIs, supra note 22, § 237, at 20-3. According to Norris the list, as
it appears herein, has the factors arranged in order of relative importance. Id. This list
was, in fact, originally articulated in the reverse order by the Supreme Court in The
Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 14 (1869).
59. The Charles Henry, 5 F. Cas. 509 (E.D.N.Y. 1865) (No. 2617). "The spirit of
the rule requires that salvage awards, while they should not be extravagant, should al-
ways be generous." Id. at 510. See also 3A M. NORRIs, supra note 22, § 241, at 20-8.
60. The possibility of reward will at times encourage the salvor to act when there
is no need. The court must find that the salvage operation was necessary under the
"marine peril" requirement for there to be a valid claim. Also, the court must determine
whether or not the salvors acted against the will of the owners in giving assistance. See,
e.g., Consolidated Towing Co. v. Hannah, 509 F. Supp. 1031 (W.D. Miss. 1981).
1982]
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hand, if the award is too conservative, the public policy of encouraging
salvage services may be defeated, undermining the primary reason for
the salvage award." '
The lack of a clear standard to apply in setting salvage awards
has resulted in decisions that are understandably varied, and of little
precedential value.6 ' The equitable principles applied in this area have
created a system that produces differing awards for similar work." In
early American history the vice-admiralty courts were inclined to
award fifty percent of the value of the property salvaged."' This judg-
ment was reserved for cases deemed to be extremely meritorious."' To-
day, such generous awards are given more sparingly,e6 usually only
when a great amount of time and money has been spent salvaging
property whose value is less than the costs of the operation. s Through
the frequent use of finder's law in marine salvage cases, however, the
courts have achieved a similar result and have given even more sub-
stantial awards in extreme cases." The finder's rationale is appealing
in that the question before the court is one of property title rather
than the difficult task of deciding the exact amount of the salvage
61. See The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1 (1869). The Court said that the law
should reward salvors sufficiently to withdraw all temptation to embezzle or conceal the
salvaged property. Id. at 14. See also 1 M. NORIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 210 (2d ed.
1962).
62. The Caster Hall, 213 F. 436, 437 (5th Cir. 1914).
To determine whether services rendered to a ship in
peril are strictly salvage service, and whether salvors are enti-
tled to be rewarded therefor in the admiralty, adjudged cases
are of great help in reaching a correct decision, and the same
may be said as to many other questions arising in salvage
cases; but, where the amount of award is the only vital ques-
tion, very little assistance is obtained by study and analysis of
the facts in other salvage cases.
Id.
63. Chief Justice Marshall in The Sybil, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 98, 99 (1836) said
that "[iln such cases, it is almost impossible that different minds, contemplating the
same subject, should not form different conclusions as to the amount of salvage to be
decreed." See generally, C. SUTTON, supra note 29.
64. See, e.g., The Henry Ewbank, 11 F. Cas. 1166 (C.C. Mass. 1833) (No. 6376).
The award of one-half of the value of the property is considered a moiety. Id. at 1174-75.
65. See 3A M. NoRRIs, supra note 22, § 130, at 9-1; § 240, at 20-7.
66. Id. § 130, at 9-1.
67. See, e.g., Brady v. The Steamship African Queen, 179 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Vir.
1960). Here the salvors spent $112,000 in the recovery of a stern section of an abandoned
and grounded vessel. This amount exceeded the value of the recovered stern, given its
damaged condition. The court held that the salvors were entitled to receive the entire
proceeds from the sale of the property. Id. at 324.
68. For an in-depth discussion of the law of finds in marine salvage cases, see




Even after a salvor has successfully shown the presence of all
three elements necessary for a valid claim, the action may fail if the
property recovered is not of salvageable character.70 Public policy has
dictated the need to protect only certain kinds or types of property on
the high seas.71 Therefore, the property saved must be the kind that
entitles the salvor to a reward, or the law of salvage will not be
applied.
72
Primarily, the law of salvage and its underlying public policy fo-
cus on the distressed vessel and her cargo to determine the type of
property to be protected.7 3 A wreck, or any property in such a state,
may be the subject of a salvage claim.7 1 Certain exceptions, however,
have been carved out of the general rule making mail and bills of ex-
change ineligible for salvage awards." Also, the personal property and
wearing apparel of both passengers and crew have a similar policy-
based exemption.7 Money, bullion, precious metals and jewels are
property against which salvage awards can be granted.7 8 The salvage-
able character requirement, therefore, is no bar to treasure hunters,
who are more interested in finding coins, artifacts and jewels than in
raising the vessel itself for possible economic gain. Clearly, the law of
69. Courts have recently been less inclined to use or discuss the factors involved
in a salvage award, rather they are deciding claims based upon the "reasoned" conclusion
as to property title. See, e.g., Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less, of Italian Marble, 186
F.Supp. 452, 456 (E.D. Va. 1960).
70. See 3A M. NORIS, supra note 22, § 32, at 3-1.
71. See, e.g., id. § 43, at 3-17.
72. See Cope v. Vallete Dry Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625 (1887). Unless the service
rendered is one that can be considered a salvage service, no valid claim will be found.
Historically, the rescue of certain barges and rafts or docks has not been considered to be
within the class of property deemed proper for salvaging. Id. at 629-30.
73. See id. at 629-31. It is unquestioned that cargo or property recovered from a
ship is the proper subject of a salvage award. See Baker v. Hoag, 7 N.Y. 555 (1853).
74. A wreck is defined as any stranded or sunken vessel that has been abandoned
by its owner. The term applies equally to any part or fragment of a ship or cargo. 3A M.
NORRIs, supra note 22, § 42, at 3-16.
75. See, e.g., The Burlington, 73 F. 258 (E.D. Mich. 1896). For a modern exam-
ple, see Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F. 2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978).
76. See, e.g., The Admiral Evans, 286 F. 442 (D. Wash. 1932); The Emblem, 8 F.
Cas. 611 (D. Me. 1840) (No. 4434). Public policy has kept certain kinds of cargo, such as
mail, from being considered proper for a salvage claim because retention or sale would
not be in the public interest. See 3A M. NoRRIs, supra note 22, § 43, at 3-17.
77. See 3A M. NORRIs, supra note 22, § 43, at 3-17. It has been pointed out that
because of the labor and extreme peril involved with the recovery of sunken property
these distinctions would not be made in the case of an ancient sunken wreck. Id. § 43, at
3-18 n.7.
78. See 1 M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 210 (2d ed. 1962).
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salvage has accepted the raising of sunken treasure as amenable to the
salvage award since the earliest maritime history. 9
All awards arising from salvage operations on navigable waters
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal admiralty courts.80 Dis-
trict courts of the United States have enjoyed exclusive original juris-
diction over salvage awards since 1789."' State court jurisdiction has
been limited to cases based upon contract damages and quantum me-
ruit actions for compensation.8 2 As a result of the federal courts' long-
standing and continued experience with the peculiar equitable charac-
ter of salvage cases, they have developed an expertise in salvage law
that is not found in any other court."'
With this basic understanding of the fundamental policies of the
79. The Rhodians were a naval power some nine hundred years before the Chris-
tian Era. Of the existing fragments of the Rhodian maritime code that have been found,
one article indicates the application of their salvage law to sunken treasure. Article
XLVII states that "[i]f gold, or silver, or any other thing be drawn up out of the sea
eight cubits deep, he that draws it up shall have one third, and if fifteen cubits, he shall
have one-half, because of depth." See 1 JUSTICE: SEA-LAws 231 (3d ed. 1705), reprinted
in 3A M. NoRRis, supra note 22, § 5, at 1-7.
80. Andrew v. Wall, 44 U.S. 567 (1844). See 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1976). The
statute gives original jurisdiction to admiralty courts and is the present successor to the
original grant, which is contained in the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77
(1789). The admiralty court acquires in rem jurisdiction based upon the location of the
find and continued presence of the property recovered. See e.g., Fla. Dep't of State v.
Treasure Salvors, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 3304 (1982); Platoro, 518 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. Tex.
1981). See also infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
81. 7A MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTICE § 200(2] (2d ed. 1981). Pursuant to the grant
of authority contained in article III, § 2 of the Constitution, Congress authorized district
court jurisdiction in admiralty cases in the original Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789,
1 Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789).
82. See, e.g., 3A M. NoRms, supra note 22, § 14, at 1-19. Each of these actions is
considered to lack the quality and character necessary to invoke the original jurisdiction
of the federal courts. Id.
83. See Sturgis v. Law, 5 N.Y. Super. Ct. (3 Sandf.) 451 (1850). In this early
state court decision, the court said with respect to the admiralty court:
If there is a court of ancient and acknowledged jurisdiction in
such cases, which is peculiarly adapted to apply those ex-
traordinary and anamolous principles of justice which govern
salvage cases... which has a system of practice and of equi-
table rules admirably adapted to such cases, and which have
grown up from the constant, unquestioned, and long contin-
ued exercise of its jurisdiction; it deserves consideration
whether the salvor should not be required to select such a
court, rather than one which possesses none of the qualifica-
tions, and which can lay no other claim to the jurisdiction,
than that in the course of the centuries it has once exercised it




law of salvage, the focus of this inquiry may now shift to a more theo-
retical aspect of salvage law, the identification of the owner of the re-
covered property.
THE BRITISH RULE
Tracing the development of the law of property rights in treasure
found at sea is made more difficult by the limited number of cases on
the subject and by the disagreements that existed among the ancient
commentators. " The historical development of the English law of sal-
vage is valuable to the study of American salvage law in two respects.
First, due to British maritime dominance during the period in which
salvage law developed, the laws of many countries, including those of
the United States, are rooted in the British rule.86 Second, due to the
special nature of the law, much of it has remained unchanged since its
first development.86 To the American practitioner, British law is per-
haps most interesting as a study of divergent rules having common ori-
gins. With similar beginnings, the laws of England and the United
States have developed diametrically opposite results.
8 7
The British rule of salvage confers ownership of abandoned prop-
erty found at sea upon the crown by virtue of a "sovereign preroga-
tive." The earliest codification of this common law notion was in 1275
by the Statute of Westminster, which spoke of the sovereign's right to
wrecks of the sea.88
Concerning wrecks of the sea, it is agreed,
that where a man, a dog, or a cat escape quick out
of the ship, that such ship nor barge, nor any
thing within them, shall be adjudged wreck; but
the goods shall be saved and kept by view of the
sheriff, coroner, or the king's baliff, and delivered
into the hands of such as are of the town where
the goods were found; so that if any sue for these
goods, and after prove that they were his, or per-
ished in his keeping, within a year and a day,
they shall be restored to him without delay; and
84. Kenny & Hrusoff, Ownership of the Treasure of the Sea, 9 WM & MARY L.
REV. 383, 384 (1967). There were major points of conflict between the writers Bracton,
Coke and Blackstone; this article is a comprehensive and detailed study of these conflicts
and the development of the laws of Great Britain and the United States.
85. Id. at 385.
86. Id. at 392.
87. See infra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
88. Statute of Westminster, 1275, 3 Edw., ch. 4.
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if not they shall remain to the king and be seized
by the sheriffs, coroners, and baliffs, and shall be
delivered to them of the town, which shall answer
before the justices of the wreck belonging to the
king.
89
The terms of this first codification limited the king's right to
property at sea to "wrecks." Even with the Westminster Statute, the
law remained vague and entirely subject to royal whim." It was not
until the 18th century that limitation took hold, and then it was only
through the further classifications of property by Blackstone and his
contemporaries.
Blackstone believed that the term "wreck" should be narrowly
defined to confer upon the king the right only to that property lost at
sea which had reached shore.91 Blackstone classified goods lost at sea
into four categories: (1) wreck, (2) flotsam, (3) jetsam and (4) lagan.2
Flotsam was defined as goods lost at sea that were still afloat; jetsam
were goods that had sunk as a result of being thrown overboard in an
effort to lighten the load and save the ship; and lagan was simply jet-
sam that was still afloat and buoyed to facilitate recovery." It is impor-
tant to note that any of the latter three categories were potentially
wreck, provided they reached the shore."
In The Constable's Case,98 the court extended the king's right to
property found at sea by interpreting the Statute of Westminster to
include flotsam, jetsam and lagan." The British rule developed into its
present form through a series of decisions handed down between 1798
and 1837.97 After 1837, it was well-settled that, in the absence of the
original owner, the English common law would decide ownership for all
property lost at sea in favor of the crown by virtue of the sovereign
prerogative.' 8
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. See Kenny & Hrusoff, supra note 84, at 387-89.
91. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARES *282. Blackstone concluded that the pur-
pose of the statute was to lessen the harshness of the existing common law by allowing




94. See Note, Title to Treasure in Territorial Waters, U. FLA. L. REv. 360, 361
(1969).
95. 77 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1601).
96. Id. at 221.
97. See Kenny & Hrusoff, supra note 84, at 390.
98. In The Aquila, 165 Eng. Rep. 87 (Adm. 1798), some years after the American
Revolution, a British court said, "I consider it to be the general rule of civilized coun-
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With regard to salvaged sea treasure, it is debatable whether the
question of ownership would be settled in favor of the crown under the
common law framework existing during the period of the American
Revolution. The Blackstone classifications of goods lost at sea would
exclude most sunken property recovered from the sea. Such property
would, therefore, not come within any of the categories that would au-
tomatically revert to the king. Notwithstanding The Constable's Case
extension of the sovereign prerogative, the property would not meet
any of the Blackstone classifications." Thus, title to recovered treasure
could arguably be decided in favor of the finder solely on the basis of
possession.
Another important consideration in the disposition of title to
property recovered from the sea floor is the principle of treasure trover.
Treasure trover is the term used by the early common law to describe
any gold, silver, plate, bullion, jewelry or pottery found concealed in
the earth, or in any private place that is not on or above the ground,
which was placed there for safe-keeping by the owner who had the in-
tent to return for it.100 Originally, all treasure trover belonged to the
first finder. 10' As the principle of treasure trover developed, however, it
followed a course similar to that of salvage, in which ownership was
decided in favor of the crown pursuant to the king's expanding prerog-
ative under The Constable's Case. Blackstone concluded that the
king's right of coinage could be adequately protected only by extending
the royal prerogative to include any treasure trover found on the
land. 02 He argued, however, that the royal prerogative never extended
tries, that what is found derelict on the seas, is acquired beneficially for the sovereign, if
no owner shall appear." Id. at 89. This case and a number of cases that followed made
the right of the sovereign almost undisputed against all others in the world, except the
original owners. See Kenny & Hrusoff, supra note 84, at 390.
99. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 91, *280-84. Based upon the four catego-
ries of property recovered at sea, it is apparent that sunken treasure would be excluded.
100. Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F. Supp. at 525. See also 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra
note 91, *285.
101. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 91, *287.
102. Id. Blackstone wrote:
So that it seems it is the hiding, not the abandoning of [trea-
sure trover], that gives the king a property .... A man, that
hides his treasure in a secret place, evidently does not mean to
relinquish his property; but reserves a right of claiming it
again, when he sees occasion; and, if he dies and the secret
also dies with him, the law gives it the king, in part of his
royal revenue....
Formerly all treasure-trove belonged to the finder. ...
Afterwards it was judged expedient for the purposes of the
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to treasure found at sea."0 3 An explanation for this inconsistency is
that the royal prerogative over sunken property at sea is incompatible
with the existing property classifications of salvage. Sunken treasure is
always "lost" and can rarely be considered to have been intentionally
concealed by the original owner who intended to return.'0 4 Therefore,
treasure found at sea is not treasure trover that can be claimed by the
sovereign, and as a result, British law does not speak specifically to the
property rights in recovered sea treasure. The general principle of the
sovereign prerogative, however, would be used to guide a court in
awarding title to such property. It is upon this foundation of British
law that the American law of salvage evolved.
THE AMERICAN RULE
United States courts have consistently disagreed with the British
rule and its use of the sovereign prerogative doctrine in the settlement
of title disputes. 0 5 In the absence of the original owner, United States
courts have given preference to the rights of the finder over those of
the sovereign.'" This polar result is the primary distinction between
the two rules of salvage law. 0 7 If the original owner is known or reas-
serts his claim at the completion of the salvage operation, however,
courts in the United States generally follow the English rule and will
favor the owner's claim over all others.
08
When the dispute over ownership is solely between the finder and
the sovereign, and involves no claim by the original owner, the majority
view in the United States is that the finder's claim should prevail.' °" In
state, and particularly for the coinage, to allow part of what
was so found to the king ....
Id. *285-86 (emphasis added).
103. See Note, Title to Treasure in Territorial Waters, U. FLA. L. REv. 360, 362
(1969).
104. Essential to the character of treasure trover is the intentional concealment
of the property by the original owner for safekeeping. Treasure trover would, therefore,
have little application in the area of salvage law. In the past, however, the principle has
caused some confusion in the courts and commentators despite the apparent limitation.
See Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F. Supp. at 525 (citing 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abandonment § 6
(1964)).
105. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., United States v. Tyndale, 116 F. 820, 823 (Ist Cir. 1902). See also
infra note 115.
107. Kenny & Hrusoff, supra note 84, at 393.
108. Id. at 392.
109. See Thompson v. United States, 62 Ct. Cl. 516 (1926). In this case the Gov-
ernment was required to render just compensation to the salvor of an abandoned vessel
when the Government subsequently obtained possession. The court stated that: "It
seems well settled that when a vessel is derelict and alandoned in the navigable waters
of the United States or anywhere else it belongs to that person who finds it and reduces
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this situation neither party is required to prove actual abandonment
but only that the original owner is not known.1 Courts in the United
States normally acknowledge the British sovereign prerogative rule,
but then go on to hold for the finder."' Two justifications are given for
applying the American rule. First, courts have relied upon the principle
that it is not pure English common law that is practiced in the United
States, but rather the modified common law which existed and was
adopted by the Colonies prior to 1776.2 In United States v. Tyn-
dale," s the court ruled that the severe British common law rule as to
wrecked property did not find favor in the Colonies prior to 1776 be-
cause of radically different policy considerations." 4 The second, and
perhaps more important justification, is that although the United
States Government may have the inherent power to assert ownership
in salvaged property, Congress has never actually done so."' The
American rule then, gives title and ownership to the first party to take
possession of salvaged property not claimed by the original owner.
For over a century, United States courts have consistently fa-
vored the rights of the finder over those of the sovereign. 1 6 In almost
it to possession." Id. at 524.
110. See Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499, 509 (1861). But see Weber Marine, Inc.
v. One Large Cast Steel, 478 F. Supp. 973 (E.D. La. 1979) (The mere discovery of goods
and the inability to locate the owner was not sufficient to constitute abandonment. The
marine salvors are entitled only to a salvage award).
111. Kenny & Hrusoff, supra note 84, at 393.
112. This is the most obvious of the justifications for refusing to apply the Brit-
ish rule in America. Because the king's unchallenged right to title of salvaged property
developed relatively late, a court could argue that the rule was not part of the law which
the Colonies adopted at the time of the American Revolution. Commentators consider
that Talbot v. Lewis, 172 Eng. Rep. 1383 (Ex. 1834) was the British case which finally
crystallized the common law rule. It was not decided until 1834, well after the Declara-
tion of Independence, and, consequently, is not binding upon United States courts. See
Kenny & Hrusoff, supra note 84, at 390.
113. 116 F. 820 (1st Cir.. 1902).
114. Id. at 823. The court points to the codification of ordinances and usages in
The Body of Liberties, enacted in 1641 by the Massachusetts Bay Colony, as exemplify-
ing this divergence in policy. Id.
115. See United States v. Tyndale, 116 F. 820, 823 (1st Cir. 1902); Thompson v.
United States, 62 Ct. Cl. 516 (1926). Both cases acknowledged the inherent power of the
United States to assert ownership over treasures recovered from the sea. Both point out,
however, that Congress has never exercised this power. Because there was no statutory
intent or consistent practice to award ownership to the United States the courts refused
to find the United States Treasury able to assert an "American Prerogative." See also
infra notes 158-70 and accompanying text.
116. In Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d 330, the court spoke of the American rule:
Other American cases are in accord with Tyndale. See Russell
v. Proceeds of Forty Bales Cotton, 21 Fed. Cas. No. 12, 154,
pp. 42, 45-50 (S.D. Fla. 1872), aff'd 21 F. Cas. p. 50; In re
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every salvage case of that period, the courts were faced with salvaged
goods of strictly commercial value.' 17 This uniformity of decision has
been broken in recent cases where courts were asked to decide owner-
ship of property that not only had commercial but also cultural or his-
torical value.' Three state courts upheld the validity of the sovereign
ownership rule where they found strong public interest in the prop-
erty. 19 In each case the courts relied on English common law and ex-
pressly acknowledged the applicability of the British rule in the United
States courts. 0
In 1922 the United States Coast Artillery sank the battleship
Massachusetts, for target practice, off the Florida coast."' The ship
remained in the waters, and the superstructure, which protruded from
the water, became a favorite fishing spot. 2 In 1956 the Massachusetts
Company made public their intention to salvage the ship.1 1 3 The State
of Florida filed suit to enjoin the salvage operation, asserting a sover-
eign interest in the ship under English common law. 24 In State ex rel.
Ervin v. Massachusetts Co.,'1 5 the Florida Supreme Court found that
the wreck was abandoned and awarded ownership to the sovereign
under the authority of the British statutory and common law of 1775,
Moneys in Registry, 170 F. Cas. p. 470, 475 (E.D. Pa. 1909);
Thompson v. United States, 62 Ct. Cl. 516, 524 (1926). Al-
though at least one state court has invoked English common
law to award ownership of a sunken vessel to the sovereign,
the "American rule" vesting title in the finder has been widely
recognized by courts and writers .... We accept the "Ameri-
can rule" as it has been uniformly pronounced in the courts of
this nation for over a century.
Id. at 343.
117. See United States v. Tyndale, 116 F. 820 (1st Cir. 1902) (money found on a
body floating in the sea); Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less, of Italian Marble, 186 F.
Supp. 452 (E.D. Va. 1960) (cargo of marble); Murphy v. Dunham, 38 F. 503 (E.D. Mich.
1889) (cargo of coal lying at the bottom of a lake); Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499 (1861)
(cargo of lead). See also infra notes 121-37 and accompanying text.
118. For a detailed discussion of the consistency of this rule as it developed and
how it was finally breached, see Kenny & Hrusoff, supra note 84, at 393-98.
119. See infra note 120. -
120. State ex rel. Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., 95 So.2d 902, 906 (Fla. 1956), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 881 (1957); Bruton v. Flying "W" Enterprises, Inc., 273 N.C. 399, 401,
160 S.E.2d 482, 494 (1968); Platoro, Ltd. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 371 F.
Supp. 356, 360 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 508 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1975).
121. State ex rel. Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., 95 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1956), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 881 (1957).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 903-04.
125. 95 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 881 (1957).
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as adopted by Florida when it became a state.12 6 The court expressly
accepted the English common law and the British rule."1 This ration-
ale was relied upon by a North Carolina court in the case of Bruton v.
Flying "W" Enterprises, Inc.,1"' when it awarded ownership of a num-
ber of ancient ships found off its coast to the state.12' Again, the court
relied upon early state acceptance of English common law.1 "
In a recent case, Platoro, Ltd. v. Unidentified Remains of a Ves-
sel,"'1 a federal district court awarded ownership of property recovered
from a Spanish galleon to the State of Texas.182 The artifacts recovered
were considered to be of priceless historic value though their precise
market value was difficult to ascertain.'8 3 After tracing the vessel's
ownership back to the date of the wreck, the court applied the Spanish
law in effect at that time, a law similar in form to the British rule, and
held that the state retained title through a succession of govern-
ments."" Thus, Texas used the sovereign prerogative rationale to pro-
tect property that was considered to be historically significant.' 83 On
remand for determination of the proper salvage award, the district
court awarded the entire value of the property to salvors.'" Each of
126. Id. at 907.
127. Id. The court said:
We conclude, therefore, that the wreck of the vessel is a
"derelict" which, at common law, would belong to the Crown
in its office of Admiralty at the end of a year and a day, under
the authority of the English cases above cited; that since the
property was resting in territorial waters of the State of Flor-
ida .. . it is within the purview of the common law . .. and
belongs to the State in its sovereign capacity.
Id. at 907.
128. 273 N.C. 399, 160 S.E.2d 482 (1968).
129. Id. at 414, 160 S.E.2d at 492.
130. Id.
131. 371 F. Supp. 356 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 508 F.2d 1113
(5th Cir. 1975).
132. 371 F. Supp. at 360.
133. Id. at 357. The court found that "[there is no question that the artifacts
recovered are of great historical value, but unfortunately we cannot put a dollar sign on
an historic work and we are relegated to the recognized rule of commercial or market
value." Id.
134. Id. at 360. Finding no clear evidence as to the original owner's identity at
the time the vessel was sunk in 1554, the court relied upon the Spanish "one year and a
day" law to award title to the State of Texas. Id. The Spanish salvage law of 1554 was
similar to the English Statute of Westminster of 1276. See supra notes 88-94 and accom-
panying text.
135. Id. at 357.
136. Platoro, 518 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. Tex. 1981). Trial on the merits of this case
was heard by a different district court after the court of appeals reversed and remanded
for rehearing. In dicta, the district court found the state ownership result to be clearly
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these cases illustrates the valid application of the British sovereign
prerogative rule; each recognized the inherent public interest in sal-
vaged property and the presence of a relatively low commercial
value.1 37 The states in each case claimed title, not through statute, but
through sovereignty traced back to the time of the wreck. ss
A recent series of Fifth Circuit decisions has mounted a challenge,
based on federal prerogative, to the salvor's ownership of property."
9
In these cases, the courts considered whether the federal government
had asserted, through statute, its inherent right to title in property
found at sea.140 As in the Platoro case, the property involved was of
great cultural and historical significance. In 1622, the Spanish vice-
flagship Nuestra Senora de Atocha and twenty-eight sister ships were
transporting gold and silver, freshly mined from the new world, to
King Philip IV.'" Two days after setting sail, a hurricane forced the
fleet back onto coral reefs near the Florida Keys.1 42 The Spanish trea-
sure1 4 3 remained on the ocean floor until 1971 when Mel Fisher of
erroneous, for lack of merit, but conceded that the doctrine of res judicata bound the
court to the first conclusion regardless of its accuracy. Id. at 820. In deciding the salvage
award the court considered each element of a valid salvage service claim in detail, and
awarded the entire value of the recovered artifacts to the salvors. The judge said:
[T]he Court finds that Platoro's adequate and just salvage
award is equal to or perhaps in excess of the sum which a sale
would bring. Therefore, it will allow the State to satisfy judg-
ment by relinquishing title of the res to Platoro .... Such an
award is not excessive in view of the great historical and
archaeological value the State's witnesses attribute to the find.
The salvors should be amply rewarded.
Id. at 823. The court also awarded the salvors $63,800.00 in attorney's fees and court
costs. Id. The salvors, after three district court and two court of appeals decisions, ob-
tained right to the property which was recovered from the sea in 1967. The salvage oper-
ation only took a few months, while the salvage award took fourteen years.
137. In each of the above cases, the courts found the market values difficult to
determine. Although the cultural and historical values were identifiable, they could not,
however, be easily translated into a dollar amount. See supra note 133.
138. See Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 408 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Fla. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Treasure Salvors #1];
Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978). See also Platoro, 518 F. Supp. 816
(W.D. Tex. 1981).
139. See Treasure Salvors #1, 408 F. Supp. at 909; Treasure Salvors #2, 569
F.2d at 340; Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F. Supp. at 511.
140. This question was answered negatively in United States v. Tyndale, 116 F.
820 (1st Cir. 1902). See supra note 115.
141. Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d at 333.
142. Id.
143. The present value of the loss has been estimated to be one hundred million




Treasure Salvors, Inc. discovered a single lead musket ball from the
lost fleet."' Since that time, Fisher has continued to salvage the re-
mains of what is believed to be the Atocha."' Five important salvage
decisions"' resulted from litigation concerning his find; each question-
ing whose property rights should be favored: the finder's or the sover-
eign's. The five cases are Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified
Wreck and Abandoned Sailing Vessel #1,14, #2,146 #3,14" #4,1" #5.151
In asserting ownership over the salvaged property the United
States argued two alternative theories of title. The first theory argued
that the Antiquities Act"' and the Abandoned Property Act'6 3 applied
to all objects on the outer continental shelf; the second argued that
the federal government, as successor to the British crown, derived title
under a sovereign prerogative.155 The court in Treasure Salvor #2
summarily rejected the latter argument, stating: "We accept the
'American rule' as it has been uniformly pronounced in the courts of
the nation for over a century."'" The court went on to hold that
neither the Abandoned Property Act nor any other legislation that was
said to incorporate the British prerogative, had done so effectively.
57
In considering the statutory basis for the government's assertion
of title, the court first examined the Abandoned Property Act.158 The
opinion noted that the statute applied to property that had been
wrecked, abandoned or became derelict' 5 ' and that the Act referred
144. Id. at 788.
145. Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d at 333.
146. See infra notes 147-51.
147. See Treasure Salvors #1, 408 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Fla. 1976), modified, 569
F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978).
148. See Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978).
149. See Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F. Supp. 507 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
150. See Fla. Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 621 F.2d 1340 (5th Cir.
1980), afl'd, 102 S. Ct. 3304 (1982).
151. See Fla. Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 3304 (1982).
152. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1976).
153. 40 U.S.C. § 310 (1976).
154. See infra note 161.
155. See Treasure Salvors #1, 408 F. Supp. at 909; Treasure Salvors #2, 569
F.2d at 340.
156. Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d at 343. The court also said: "In spite of the
arguments advanced by Chancellor Kent, the notion of sovereign prerogative never took
root in America." Id. at 342.
157. See Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d at 337-43. See infra notes 161-67 and
accompanying text.
158. 40 U.S.C. § 310 (1976).
159. Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d at 341. The district court on remand said: "It
would amaze and surprise most citizens of this country, when their dream, at greatest of
costs, was realized, that agents of respective governments would, on the most flimsy of
1982]
N.Y.J. INT'L & Comp. L.
only to property "strewn about the country and its harbors during the
Civil War." 1 0 This narrow interpretation of property controlled by the
Act clearly excluded the Atocha.
In arguing for ownership under the Antiquities Act, 61 the United
States based its claim of territorial jurisdiction and control over the
salvage site on the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).1 s
The OCSLA grants to the federal government jurisdiction and control
over the "lands" constituting the outer continental shelf, 63 and reflects
a congressional intent to assert control over the development of min-
eral resources on, the outer continental shelf.' " The court noted that
the limited grant of jurisdiction in the OCSLA extended control to
only those properties within the natural resource exploitation focus of
the Act.11s The court also discussed the applicability of the Convention
of the Continental Shelf, 66 which became effective after the enactment
of the OCSLA, stating that the Act superceded any incompatibility of
terms." 7 In addition, the court considered the International Law Com-
mission's statement that: "It is clearly understood that the rights in
question do not cover objects such as wrecked ships and their cargo
(including bullion) lying on the seabed or covered by sand of the sea-
bed. '  The court held that neither the OCSLA nor the Convention
extended the necessary control for the purposes of ownership under
the Antiquities Act to wrecks. Therefore, the OCSLA did not extend
jurisdiction over wrecks for the purposes implied in the Antiquities
Act.169 The court concluded that: "Congress has not exercised its sover-
eign prerogative to the extent necessary to justify a claim for an aban-
doned vessel located on the outer continental shelf. Under the facts of
grounds, lay claim to the treasure." Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F. Supp. at 511.
160. Treasure Salvors #1, 408 F. Supp. at 909.
161. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1976). The Antiquities Act applies only to land which
is owned or controlled by the government. Treasure Salvors #1, 408 F. Supp. at 910.
162. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1976).
163. See United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 526 (1975).
164. See Guess v. Read, 290 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1961). The court said that: "The
Continental Shelf Act was enacted for the purpose, primarily, of asserting ownership of
and jurisdiction over the minerals in and under the continental shelf." Id. at 625.
165. Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d at 339. "[A]n extension of jurisdiction for
purposes of controlling the exploitation of the natural resources of the continental shelf
is not necessarily an extension of sovereignty." Id. See also supra note 164.
166. Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d at 339.
167. Id. at 339-40. See United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16, 21 (5th Cir. 1970).
168. Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d at 340 (quoting 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
9) at 42, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956)) (emphasis added).
169. See supra note 168.
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this case, possession and title are rightfully conferred upon the finder
"170
The Treasure Salvors and Platoro cases arose where a federal or
a state government, respectively, asserted a right to property recovered
from the depths of the sea.171 In each of these actions the governments
argued for the use of the British rule and the application of a sovereign
prerogative. 17 The governments' attorneys knew at the outset that fed-
eral courts have consistently applied the opposite rule, title to the
finder. The modern distinction, however, was made regarding recov-
ered property that is of great cultural and historical value.173 The
Treasure Salvors decisions dismissed this argument as being irrelevant
to the outcome of the title question.' 7' The district court judge in
Platoro followed this conclusion, in spirit, by awarding the entire value
of the recovered property to the salvors."7 The continued viability of
the American rule has been clearly upheld.
SALVAGE LAW VERSUS FINDER'S LAW
Another major source of conflict in the law of salvage is encoun-
tered when the original owner is known and reasserts a claim to sal-
vaged property. In such circumstances courts and commentators in the
United States have been unable to agree upon a uniform rule for the
proper disposition of title. 7 6 Conflict and confusion have arisen in re-
gard to the applicable law in cases in which the original owner, having
apparently abandoned property at sea, reasserts ownership after that
property is salvaged. 77 American courts have been unable to agree
upon which law, salvage law or finder's law, should be applied to de-
cide ownership. s7 8 Under the law of salvage, the right and title to re-
covered property remains with the owner even after abandonment.' 7
170. Treasure Salvors #1, 408 F. Supp. at 911.
171. See Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978); Platoro, 518 F.
Supp. 816 (W.D. Tex. 1981).
172. See Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d at 340-43; Platoro, 518 F. Supp. at 819-
20.
173. Each of these cases involved property of significant historic value dating
back to the 1600's.
174. See, e.g., Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978).
175. Platoro, 518 F. Supp. at 823; see supra note 136.
176. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
177. See infra notes 181-201 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less, of Italian Marble, 186 F.
Supp. 452 (E.D. Va. 1960). The opinion acknowledged the conflict of authority in this
area of the admiralty law and examined the arguments of each view, holding the law of
finds more persuasive. Id. at 456. See also Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d at 336.
179. See 3A M. NoRws, supra note 22, § 150.
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This view is in opposition to the outcome under the law of finds, which
would give title to the first party to reduce the property to
possession.8 °
At the heart of many present-day salvage decisions is the concept
of "abandonment.'' s8 Abandoned property, within the meaning of sal-
vage law, is the discarding or deserting of property by its owner or
holder, without the intention of reclaiming it.'8 ' A sunken wreck, a dis-
tressed vessel183 and a lost cargo'" can all be considered abandoned
property allowing salvage by anyone who is first to reduce it to
possession. 
8 5
Abandonment is considered to have two distinct elements:1 s the
external relinquishment of possession or control,'8 7 and an intention to
terminate ownership.' The question of abandonment is generally con-
sidered a factual one to be decided at trial. 8 9 The simplest form of
abandonment comes into being when the owner establishes a public
record announcing his intention to abandon.' e° In less overt cases the
court must scrutinize all the circumstances involved in the event.'19
180. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 91, *295-97.
181. See, e.g., Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978); Platoro, 518 F.
Supp. 816 (W.D. Tex. 1981).
182. 3A M. NoRms, supra note 22, § 134, at 9-10.
183. A distressed vessel that is abandoned and deserted without hope of recovery
will be considered a "derelict." If the crew leaves only to summon help from the shore
then this term would not apply. See The Island City, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 121 (1861).
184. Abandoned cargo can also be considered derelict. Under Blackstone's cate-
gories of lost properties, cargo would be automatically wreck, but flotsam, jetsam and
lagan could also be abandoned property under certain circumstances. See 3A M. NoRIs,
supra note 22, § 131, at 9-3. See also supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
185. Derelict and abandoned property is perhaps the most ripe property for sal-
vaging, in that the owner is not present to object to an excessive award. See The Anna, 1
F. Cas. 928 (E.D.N.Y. 1872) (No. 398), affd, 1 F. Cas. 931 (C.C.N.Y. 1873) (No. 401).
186. The Tubantia, 1924 Eng. L. Rep. 78 (Probate Division).
187. Id.
188. The element of intent is the more important of the two. The intent to re-
turn as an afterthought will not be considered valid; the court focuses on the intent of
the crew or owners at the time the deserters left the vessel. See 3A M. NoRMs, supra
note 22, § 134.
189. See Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less, of Italian Marble, 186 F. Supp. 452
(E.D. Va. 1960).
190. See Brady v. The Steamship African Queen, 179 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va.
1960) (a stranded tanker was publicly abandoned by its owners and the insurance under-
writers). Public abandonment is often in response to possible liability resulting from
damage caused by the vessel to other ships or to the environment. For an in depth dis-
cussion of the rights and mechanics of voluntary or public abandonment, see Roberts,
Sinking, Salvage and Abandonment, 51 TuL. L. REv. 1196 (1977).
191. Abandonment is fundamentally a fact question in which the court considers
the particular circumstances of the case and the inferences arising from them. See Wig-
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Some of the factors considered include the physical condition of the
property when deserted,1 92 the amount of time that has elapsed 9 ' since
the desertion and the steps taken by the owner towards recovering the
property."' Courts that have held sunken wrecks to be abandoned
have frequently focused on the length of time that has elapsed since
the loss.'" s
Under the law of salvage, the act of abandonment does not divest
original owners of their possessory rights of title.'" When a vessel is
successfully salvaged, the salvor secures the right of possession, but he
is not automatically entitled to the entire value, title or proceeds of a
sale."97 Therefore:
When property has been sunk at sea or lies
wrecked near shore, the owner has not been
divested of title by virtue of that fact. And
neither does the salvor gain title by finding it. It
is his obligation to bring the salved property
gins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less, of Italian Marble, 186 F. Supp. 452, 456 (E.D. Va. 1960).
192. The condition of the wreck reflects upon the intent of the owners. If the
abandonment occurs while the vessel is in good condition a common sense implication
can be drawn that the desertion was to summon help. Cf. The Island City, 66 U.S. (1
Black) 121, 123 (1861) (a crew temporarily left their ship; no abandonment could be
found without more proof that the abandonment was final and without hope of recovery
or intention to return); Simon v. Taylor, Leishman, Bastian, Dickie, [1975] 2 Lloyd's
L.R. 338 (Sing. Ct. 1974) (a German U-boat was torpedoed and sank with all hands on
board; no abandonment was found as the crew did not form or have the intention to
abandon the vessel).
193. See Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less, of Italian Marble, 186 F. Supp. 452
(E.D. Va. 1960). The court said: "While lapse of time and nonuser [sic] are not sufficient,
in and of themselves, to constitute an abandonment, these factors may, under certain
circumstances, give rise to an implication of intention to abandon." Id. at 456. In Trea-
sure Salvors #2, the court held that: "Disposition of a wrecked vessel whose very loca-
tion has been lost for centuries as though its owners were still in existence stretches a
fiction to absurd lengths." 569 F.2d at 337.
194. The effort of the owners in conserving the condition of the wreck is vital to
the finding of an intent to abandon. The physical elements such as removal of equip-
ment, absence of markers or buoys, and general lack of concern over abuse of the prop-
erty, will negate the spoken intention to continue ownership. See De Bardelben Coal Co.
v. Cox, 16 Ala. App. 172, 76 So. 409 (1917).
195. See supra note 193. Cf. Simon v. Taylor, Leishman, Bastian, Dickie, [1975]
2 Lloyd's L.R. 338 (Sing. Ct. 1974) (a British court held that the crew of a torpedoed
German U-boat lacked the intent necessary for a finding of abandonment).
196. This view is primarily endorsed by Martin J. Norris, a commentator and
acknowledged expert in the United States on the law of salvage. See 3A M. NORRIS,
supra note 22, § 150.
197. See Twenty-three Bales of Cotton, 24 F. Cas. 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1877) (No.
14,284).
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before an admiralty court where the owner shall
be given an opportunity to come in and claim the
property."s8
Once the salvaged property is placed with a marshall or similar federal
official for safe-keeping, the salvor's right of possession creates a mari-
time lien against the property salvaged.' 9' A maritime lien is a privi-
leged claim upon the property to assure award for the salvage ser-
vice.'"0 The maritime lien (specifically the salvage lien) is an acquired
interest in the property which gives an admiralty court jurisdiction to
enforce the salvor's claim.2"'
Although the salvor is not entitled to the "whole" value of the
recovered property saved under salvage law, courts give considerable
weight to abandonment in setting the proper amount for a salvage
award.202 During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, courts
viewed abandonment as the most important factor to be considered
and generally awarded one-half the property value to the successful
salvor.103 Today, the finding of "abandonment" does not result in an
automatic award of fifty percent, but it remains significant in two re-
spects. First, abandoned property is usually more difficult to recover
and implies a higher degree of danger to overcome as well as a higher
skill necessary on the part of the salvors. Second, when the owner is
not known or has publicly abandoned the property, there is a greater
temptation to conceal the recovery and so a more liberal award is nec-
essary to encourage disclosure.2 Therefore, under salvage law, al-
though abandonment does not give the first possessor title to the prop-
erty, it does become an important factor in determining the amount of
the salvage award.
If a court considers "abandonment" to be the total discarding of
an owner's right and title to property, the outcome of a salvage claim
can dramatically change. Under the law of finds, title to abandoned
198. 3A M. NORRIS, supra note 22, § 150, at 11-2 (footnotes omitted).
199. See, e.g., The Akaba, 54 F. 197 (4th Cir. 1893).
200. Id.
201. A maritime lien gives the admiralty court exclusive jurisdiction in the form
of an in rem action against the property for the proper award. See 3A M. Nowms, supra
note 22, § 150. See also supra note 80.
202. Public abandonment commonly occurs after the original owner has been un-
successful in an attempt to recover the lost property from the sea. A court should, there-
fore, give more weight to the salvage service factors of "risk incurred" and "skill em-
ployed" when there is a public abandonment. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying
text.
203. See 3A M. NORRIS, supra note 22, § 130, at 9-1; § 240, at 20-7.
204. 1 M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 210 (2d ed. 1962). See also supra note
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property vests in the first party to reduce it to possession. 0 5 The ori-
gins of finder's rights are in the Laws of Oleron2° which spoke primar-
ily to property "which has never belonged to any man," and vested
title in the "first finder. 2 0 7 Blackstone applied this idea to treasure
found at sea rather than the sea's natural treasure, i.e. fish and pre-
cious stones.
[A] man that scatters this treasure into the sea, or
upon the public surface of the earth, is construed
to have absolutely abandoned his property, and
returned it into common stock, without any in-
tention of reclaiming it, and therefore it belongs,
as in a state of nature, to the first occupant, or
finder .... 208
The use of a finder's theory in cases where the original owner reasserts
claim to recovered property has had a major impact on the law of sal-
vage, adding to the confusion present in modern salvage law.209
The decision in a particular case will, then, depend upon the
court's application of one of divergent theories as reflected in the inter-
pretation of the term "abandonment." It is logical for the court to con-
sider property that has been lost for many years as a proper subject for
a "find," especially in cases where the salvor recovers sea treasures af-
ter expending a great amount of time and money. In cases of extreme
inequity, courts have awarded the entire value of the property to the
salvors, while deciding the case under the law of salvage.1 Recently,
however, courts in the United States have endorsed the use of the law
205. When a court applies the finds rationale the parties are treated as if the
original owner made no claim or is not known. The decision as to title, then, would be
controlled by the American rule in deciding between the rights of the finder and the
sovereign. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Treasure Salvors
#2, 569 F.2d at 337; Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less, of Italian Marble, 186 F. Supp.
452, 456-57 (E.D. Va. 1960).
206. The Laws of Oleron, art. XXXIV, reprinted in 30 F. Cas. 1171-87. The arti-
cle states:
If any man happens to find any thing in the sea, or in
the sand on the shore, in floods or in rivers, if it be precious
stones, fish, or any treasure of the sea, which has never be-
longed to any man in point of property, it belongs to the first
finder.
Id. at 1184 (emphasis added).
207. Id. (emphasis added).
208. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 91, *290-94.
209. See supra note 178.
210. See Brady v. The Steamship African Queen, 179 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va.
1960).
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of finds as a guiding principle in the disposition of title resulting from
a salvage claim.2" In Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less, of Italian
Marble,'" the salvage operation began 66 years after the loss of the
vessel.213 The court held the wreck to be abandoned, ruling that the
first party that had taken possession was to be considered the "first
finder." 1 The salvors were found to have legal title to the vessel be-
cause of their right of possession.1 5
This recent endorsement by the courts of the "finds" rationale,
and their interpretation of abandonment, is in conflict with the struc-
ture and conformity created by the law of salvage. 1 One expert
warned against this break with the authority of the admiralty court's
decisions on title. Martin Norris has written:
In consonance with the established policy of
the maritime law that salvors should look to the
admiralty courts for reward, the settlement of dis-
putes and the ultimate disposition of the rescued
property, it is, in my opinion, far better and wiser
not to recognize or regard publicly abandoned
property as a "find.'
17
The Norris view of salvage "abandonment" has not found acceptance
in the courts.2 18 The "finds" interpretation of abandonment has ena-
bled the courts to avoid the difficult and perhaps arduous task of de-
termining the exact dollar amount for a specific salvage award. This
endorsement and popular use of the principle of finds, however, threat-
ens the delicate balance of public policy considerations that have been
the historic justifications for salvage law. The structure, uniformity and
expertise contributed to the law of admiralty by the federal courts
211. See, e.g., Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978). The court ap-
plied the law of finds, saying: "Disposition of a wrecked vessel whose very location has
been lost for centuries as though its owner were still in existence stretches a fiction to
absurd lengths. The law of salvage does not contemplate a different result." Id. at 337.
See also Platoro, 518 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. Tex. 1981).
212. 186 F. Supp. 452 (E.D. Va. 1960).
213. Id. at 456.
214. Id. "This Court is unable to perceive why cargo, remaining in the hull of a
derelict vessel for 66 years with no claim of ownership, must now be sold by the Marshall
to clear title to same." Id. at 457.
215. Id. at 456.
216. 3A M. NORRIS, supra note 22, § 158, at 11-15.
217. M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SALVAGE § 158, at 138 (Supp. 1974).
218. See, e.g., Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less, of Italian Marble, 186 F.
Supp. 452, 456 (E.D. Va. 1960). The court found that the view argued by Norris was
without case support or logical application in most cases of recovered sunken property.
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should not be limited by reducing a salvage claim and decision to a
showing of possession with the automatic application of a "finder's-
keepers" rationale.
A FACTUAL APPLICATION OF MODERN SALVAGE LAW
Modern treasure hunting is both a sport for the enthusiast and a
business for the salvage corporation. Technological advancement has
made the news of recovered sunken property a common occurrence.
Public and private demand for lost "cultural" property has spurred an
international debate as to the proper techniques for salvaging of ar-
chaeologically valuable property."' As discussed above, the right of ti-
tle to the recovered property is also the focus of debate. In an attempt
to clarify the problems created by the rationale of a number of modern
salvage decisions,220 the following discussion of a recent find in United
States waters is presented.
On July 26, 1956, eleven hours after colliding with the Swedish
liner Stockholm, the Andrea Doria sank two hundred miles off the east
coast of the United States, settling on the continental shelf.2 12 Along
with forty-five lives, it was reported that one million dollars in cash
and a vast amount of jewels and other durable goods were lost that
morning. 22 Peter Gimbel has spent a great amount of time and money
over the last twenty-six years attempting to salvage what was thought
lost when the Andrea Doria sank."' In September, 1981, a crew of di-
vers led by Gimbel located and recovered one of two safes which were
aboard the vessel." 4 For the purposes of this illustration, existence and
value of the recovered property is unimportant.
Claims to property salvaged from the Andrea Doria could come
from four separate sources: (1) from the federal government asserting
title based upon arguments similar to those made in the Treasure Sal-
vors cases; (2) from the original property owners (passengers and crew);
219. See generally Note, Open Season on Ancient Shipwrecks: Implications of
the Treasure Salvors Decisions in the Fields of Archeology, History and Property Law,
4 NOVA L.J. 213 (1980).
220. See, e.g., Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978); Platoro, Ltd. v.
Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 371 F. Supp. 356 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 508 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1975).
221. Gimbel's Grail-Diving to the Andrea Doria, TIME, Sept. 14, 1981, at 22.
222. N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1981, at A24, col. 4. Estimates of the lost valuables
and currency vary between one and three million dollars. Beyond the cash believed to be
in the purser's safe, other property lost included dozens of dishes ringed with gold leaf.
Id.
223. Gimbel's Grail-Diving to the Andrea Doria, TIME, Sept. 14, 1981, at 22.
224. Id.
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(3) from the insurance underwriters who paid off the loss claims; and
(4) from Gimbel as first finder and salvor.225 The facts of the Andrea
Doria pose a complex and perhaps unique question for the laws of sal-
vage in that the span of time between loss and recovery was compara-
bly short for sunken cargo."26 Another novel factor is the existence of a
party (the insurance underwriters) who can claim original rights to the
"sea treasure" as the continuing owner of the wreck.
The United States government's claim of possession is by far the
simplest to analyze. The court in Treasure Salvors rejected any appli-
cation of the British sovereign prerogative rule in American law. 2 7
Furthermore, the OCSLA has been found to exclude property of this
kind as its jurisdiction is limited to natural resources228 The federal
government's inherent power to statutorily claim title has not been ex-
ercised. Ownership based upon possession and control could not be
successfully argued because the United States took no steps to mark or
salvage the vessel." Thus, within this factual setting, the United
States has no arguable claim to the recovered property.
The passengers and crew who lost the property recovered by
Gimbel could argue a right to title based upon original ownership con-
cepts present in the law of salvage. These original owners could argue
that they did not abandon their property, focusing on the lack of in-
tent and public action that is necessary for a finding of abandonment.
Owners who received payment from the insurance underwriters, how-
ever, would have no claim to the salvaged property.30 Others could file
suit to recover either particular pieces of property or a percentage of
the total sale.
The claims of the insurance underwriters and the salvors pose a
more difficult question for the court. The trial court must decide
whether to apply salvage law or finder's law. The underwriters would
have a claim, under salvage law, based upon their payments to the
original owners. No official statement of intent to abandon the vessel
had been made by the underwriters in the twenty-six years since the
loss. The insurance underwriter's claim, then, would ask the court to
225. Id.
226. In Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978), for example, the ves-
sel, which sank in 1622, was not located until 1971. Id. at 333.
227. Id. at 343.
228. Id. at 337-40. See also supra notes 161-69.
229. For a discussion of abandonment, see supra notes 181-95 and accompanying
text.
230. The insurance companies would step into the shoes of the original owners
and succeed to their rights and claims on the property recovered based upon the insur-
ance company's right of subrogation.
[Vol. 3
RECOVERED SEA TREASURE
apply salvage law which would not defeat their claim to title even with
a factual finding of "abandonment." The underwriters' claim would be
for the value of the property salvaged, with the court awarding a rea-
sonable amount of the value to the salvors. Under a salvage law analy-
sis, the insurance company, as original owners, would retain title to the
salvaged property.
A claim of ownership in the recovered property by Gimbel, as the
successful salvor, would be founded upon the alternative legal theory
of finder's law. The salvors were the first to take physical possession of
the property that had remained on the outer continental shelf for some
twenty-six years. Therefore, Gimbel could make a legitimate claim as
"first finder" to the recovered property. The strength of this claim
would lie in the substantial amount of time, skill and money23 ' ex-
pended on the recovery operation. Moreover, the recent endorsement
of the finder's "rationale" in the Treasure Salvors cases indicates that
a salvor could, in a case such as this involving recovered sunken prop-
erty, expect similar favorable treatment.
The identities of the two claimants in this illustration, the insur-
ance companies and the salvors, could also influence the court's analy-
sis of the salvage claim. Unlike the Treasure Salvors cases, which arose
out of a dispute between the finder and the sovereign, the present con-
flict is between the finder and the successors of the original owners.
The court should, therefore, examine the case on two levels. First, the
facts surrounding the salvage operation should be examined to deter-
mine whether the property should be considered "abandoned." Second,
the court should determine whether to apply the law of salvage or the
law of finds. In making the factual finding as to abandonment, and the
legal decision as to choice of laws, the public policy foundation of each
legal theory must be considered.
The factual question of abandonment is one aspect of the Andrea
Doria case which makes this salvage operation unique. The Andrea
Doria collided with the Stockholm in July of 1956, sinking eleven
hours later.2 " The length of time it took the vessel to sink, added to
the notoriety of the disaster, made the location of the wreck common
knowledge. Prior to Gimbel's salvage operation, however, no salvage ef-
fort had been successful. The lack of success during this twenty-six
year period was primarily due to the great depth and strong current of
the ocean two hundred miles off shore.'s It was only with the assis-
231. The estimated cost of the 35 day salvage operation is $1.5 million, with a
daily cost of $35,000 for the rental of a 190 foot support vessel.
232. Gimbel's Grail-Diving to the Andrea Doria, TIME, Sept. 14, 1981, at 22.
233. N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1981, § N.J., at 2, col. 2.
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tance of a sophisticated diving bell that some of the property of the
Andrea Doria was finally recovered by the Gimbel expedition. " 4
Two essential factors that influence the abandonment finding in
many modern salvage decisions are the time elapsed since the loss and
the lack of any legitimate original owner.2"' Clearly, neither of these
factors are present in the Andrea Doria. The insurance underwriters
have continued in existence since the disaster and have not issued any
public statement of an intent to abandon the wreck. The lapse of
twenty-six years could be justified given the placement of the wreck in
deep water and the recent development of the technology necessary for
such a hazardous operation. Given these unique factors, the court
would probably evaluate the relevant policy consideration of both sal-
vage and finder's law before making a final decision on the question of
abandonment.
2 36
The law of finds provides the greatest possible encouragement for
those with the opportunity and ability to take the risks involved in a
salvage operation. Unrestricted ownership to any and all property re-
covered is the greatest monetary incentive a salvor could possibly have.
Because encouragement of salvors is the traditional essence of salvage
law, it would be difficult to argue in favor of a mere percentage return
on a successful operation. Arguments have also been made that finder's
law is more consistent with the fundamental principles of American
society, which are to promote individualistic, self-sufficient and coura-
geous citizens.3 7
Salvage law, on the other hand, provides authoritative and or-
derly results from salvage operations with a court-reasoned award of
title and ownership. One important commentator has expressed a fear
that passing of title under the finds rationale may promote desparate
actions taken by fellow salvors between the discovery and the an-
nouncement of newly salvaged property.3 8 Salvage law would also pro-
tect the interested owner who is either not in a position to salvage the
property, or who was second to begin the salvage process. The applica-
tion of salvage law thus yields an equitable result rather than one
which bases ownership upon the ability to pay for expensive, state of
the art technology or the willingness to accept the physical risks inher-
234. Gimbel's Grail-Diving to the Andrea Doria, TIME, Sept. 14, 1981, at 22. The
Gimbel expedition was also able to recover about 100 pieces of dinner service. N.Y.
Times, Aug. 25, 1981, § 4, at 18, col. 5.
235. See Treasure Salvors #2, 569 F.2d at 337; see also supra note 193.
236. The factual finding of abandonment would, in all probability, be made only
after the court had decided which claimant, the salvor or the owner, should prevail.
237. See Treasure Salvors #1, 408 F. Supp. at 909.
238. M. NoRRIs, LAw OF SALVAGE § 158, at 138 (Supp. 1974).
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ent in a salvage operation.
The award of title should, therefore, be based upon the policy
consideration found most persuasive by the court. Traditionally the
court awards either absolute title, under the law of finds, or awards less
than fifty percent, under the salvage law to the salvors. An alternative
solution which, in the final analysis, could strike a compromise be-
tween these two inequitable and extreme results is possible. The court
has discretionary power to base its decision on salvage law and still
award a substantial portion of the value to the salvors.2 38 Before the
rise of the finder's rationale in American courts, a judge could, in ex-
treme cases, award over fifty percent of the value of the property to the
salvors. 24 0 This result was popular primarily in cases which involved
extreme danger or operations which took an extraordinary amount of
time.24  Clearly the Andrea Doria case involves both ele-
ments-extreme danger and a time-consuming salvage operation.
Thus, a substantial award of fifty percent or more to the salvors would
encourage swift maritime rescue, which is the explicit public policy
foundation of salvage law, while eliminating the harshness of the all or
nothing contest of finder's law and the unfair fifty percent limit of sal-
vage law.
CONCLUSION
In determining specific salvage awards federal courts must at-
tempt to strike a balance between the excessive encouragement of will-
ing salvors and the undue burdening of salvage property owners. The
task of setting such awards is made more difficult by the lack of relia-
ble precedent or detailed guidelines for determining a specific dollar
amount.2 42 Despite these difficulties there is a continuing public need
for legitimate and equitable court disposition of property in modern
salvage cases. The two aspects of salvage law discussed above have the
potential to produce extreme salvage awards thereby destroying the
equitable balance necessary for the proper functioning of the law of
salvage.
The incorporation of the British sovereign prerogative rule into
state antiquities statutes242 and the introduction of similar bills in
239. See, e.g., Brady v. The Steamship African Queen, 179 F. Supp. 321 (E.D.
Va. 1960). See also supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
241. Brady v. The Steamship African Queen, 179 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1960).
242. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., Fla. Archives and History Act, FLA. STAT. § 267.061 (West 1975);
Antiquities Code, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6145-9 (Vernon's 1970); Salvage of
Abandoned Shipwrecks and Other Underwater Archeological Sites, N.C. ARCHIVES &
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Congress244 illustrate modern attempts to reduce the liberal awards
which are fundamental to the salvage law's encouragement of salvors
actions. This legislated sovereign prerogative could disadvantage sal-
vors in three respects. First, the legislation would favor the govern-
ment's claim to salvaged property over that of the salvor, a rejection of
the American rule as it has been applied in the United States for over
a century.248 Second, such statutes commonly require salvage contracts
that establish percentage distributions of any property recovered in
government-controlled waters. 246 The government enjoys a markedly
superior bargaining position due to the many salvors competing for ex-
clusive rights to salvage a limited number of ancient wreck sites. As a
result, these contracts are highly "coercive" in nature2 47 and the salvor
must rely on the good faith of the government to act equitably with
treasure recovery windfall. Finally, a salvor may be disadvantaged by
legislative prerogative in situations where no contract exists. After
property is recovered in government-controlled waters, the state could
make a valid claim to title based upon the statute. In recent cases, '2 4
states have argued that although the recovered treasure was of obvious
cultural and historical value, the dollar value was impossible to deter-
mine." ' Thus, the salvage award would be more difficult to decide and
could possibly be reduced.
Judicial acceptance and use of the "finds" rationale in cases in
which the original owner is identifiable create a potential for exces-
HISTORY Acr, ch. 121, art. 3 (1974). State antiquities statutes purport to vest title to any
salvage recovered from sites located on "sovereign lands of the State." These sites are
strictly limited to the state's three-mile zone of territorial sea. FLA. STAT. § 267.061(1)(b).
244. Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. § 471 (1979).
The protection of this act is restricted to cultural resources and property found on public
lands. See also H.R. 1195, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). This bill would vest title in the
United States to all abandoned historic shipwrecks located on the outer continental
shelf.
245. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., Fla. Archives and History Act, FLA. STAT. § 267.061 (West 1975).
This Florida statute awards leases for salvage wreck sites to "archaeologists" in return
for a 25% state share in the finds. The validity of this act was examined in Treasure
Salvors #3, where the district court, in dicta, found the state regulation of salvors' rights
to be in direct conflict with substantive maritime law and therefore unconstitutional. 459
F. Supp. at 523-24. See also Cobb Coin Co., Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Aban-
doned Sailing Vessel, 525 F. Supp. 186, 200-13 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
247. See, e.g., Treasure Salvors #3, 459 F. Supp. at 522. In this case the court
held: "The coercive acts of the Division of Archives in threatening arrest and confisca-
tion voids the contract under the general maritime law." Id.
248. See, e.g., Platoro Limited, Inc. v. The Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 371
F. Supp. 356 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 508 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1975).
249.. See supra note 133.
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sively liberal awards. Rejection of the Norris view 50 (that apparent
abandonment at sea does not divest the original owner of a possessory
right to title) has had an impact on the law of salvage beyond adding
to the uncertainty that exists in the field. The use of finds as a control-
ling principle in salvage cases creates an all or nothing contest between
the owners and the salvors with the outcome depending largely on the
factual finding of abandonment." 1 If, on the facts, the court concludes
that original ownership and control was not divested, the award will be
a percentage of the value, based upon the salvage service factors.2 5 2 If,
on the other hand, abandonment is found, the court will award the
entire value of the property, or the property itself, to the salvors.
2 5
3
The courts have been able to avoid the most difficult aspects of a sal-
vage claim mainly by deciding cases based upon title, thereby eschew-
ing the difficult task of determining the specific salvage award.
Disproportionate awards, whether they are liberal or conservative
in nature, could defeat the fundamental policy considerations which
are the historic justifications for rewarding maritime salvors. The as-
sertion of title to salvaged property by federal or state officials and the
continuing use of the finds rationale in resolving salvage claims
threaten the enduring viability of such policies. Sweeping changes, ei-
ther judicial or legislative, that undermine the traditional, judge-deter-
mined salvage award would have a far reaching impact on the essential
nature and continuing value of the law of salvage.
Robert A. Koenig
250. See supra notes 196-204 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 210-18 and accompanying text. See also Wiggins v. 1100
Tons, More or Less, of Italian Marble, 186 F. Supp. 452 (E.D. Va. 1960).
252. See, e.g., Weber Marine, Inc. v. One Large Cast Steel Stockless Anchor, 478
F. Supp. 973 (E.D. La. 1979).
253. See, e.g., Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less, of Italian Marble, 186 F.
Supp. 452 (E.D. Va. 1960).
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